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Purpose:  
The basic aim of this research is to determine to what extent intellectual property owners 
of advanced manufacturing technologies compensate the disadvantages of their small size 
and peripheral company location by innovations in these areas.  
Design/methodology/approach: 
We developed an empirical study of patents from two completely different economic 
areas, a central and a peripheral one, represented by Germany and Spain, respectively, in 
the domain of the Key Enabling Technology (KET) of advanced manufacturing 
technologies in robotics and automation. From the population of 211 Spanish patents 
granted and a random sample of 500 German patents, from the files of the US Patent and 
Trademark Office, we developed a series of logistic regression models.   
Findings 
Judging from the predicted possibilities to develop a patent with more citations, a proxy 
for its value, the study shows that whereas big companies from central locations do not 
obtain more heavily cited patents from sharing their R&D activity with other firms or 
research institutes, smaller manufacturing firms in peripheral areas, namely, Spain, may 
find this advantageous. Additionally, patents containing fewer cited articles and citations 
of previous patents, tend to be cited more frequently. Finally, this same outcome is also 
observed with patents showing shorter time between the application and grant. 
Originality/value 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on patent value which examines the 
KET of advanced manufacturing technologies in robotics and automation, comparing a 
central to a peripheral geographic environment, and determining the number, diversity 
and size of patent assignees. Our results prove relevant in general for manufacturing 
businesses, especially in the Machine-Tool and machinery producing industry. 
Overwhelmingly, these firms tend to be SMEs basing their marketing activity entirely on 
a Business-to-Business (B2B) focus, and facing serious obstacles for R&D activity.  
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Introduction3 
Technology transfer is a key element in the development of innovations. Companies 
benefit from the influence of agents and factors operating nearby. According to Rogers 
(1983, 1989), in order to succeed technology transfer must obtain help from change agents 
establishing communication from innovation producers to users, adequate funding, and a 
research system oriented to finding solutions (Rogers 1989, 2002). These elements are 
hardly ever evenly distributed across geographic areas. In fact, nations or regions play a 
determinant role in providing an environment that is “forward-looking, dynamic and 
challenging” in the case of certain industries (Porter 1990, p. 73).  
It is argued that, to some extent, the competitive advantage of a firm is reliant on the 
attributes of the region or nation where it is located (Patel and Pavitt 1991). New 
industries and technologies evolve more easily in places where these are related to 
preexisting ones (Hidalgo, et al. 2007, Montresor and Quatraro 2017). According to 
Porter, firms benefit from the competitiveness of nations due to factor conditions, such as 
skilled labor, or infrastructure, demand conditions from home markets, the presence of 
related and supporting industries, and lastly, the conditions governing how firms are 
created, managed or how these compete at the domestic level (Porter 1990). 
In the case of intellectual property rights, data show a markedly uneven distribution in 
the number of patent applications, both from resident and non-resident applicants across 
types of firms and countries or regions (WIPO 2017). There is ample evidence that the 
majority of patenting records concentrate in a small number of countries and world-
leading corporate innovators (Dernis et al. 2015), notably in the case of information and 
communication technologies (Daiko et al. 2017). For instance, in 2017, with 25,490 
patent applications, Germany accounted for 15% of the total amount of applications filed 
to the European Patent Office, with the US ranking first (26%) and Japan third (13%). In 
contrast, the second country we used in our comparative study, Spain, ranked 16th, 
representing approximately 1% or 1,676 applications (WIPO 2017, Oficina Española de 
Patentes y Marcas, 2018). These differences between the two countries remain even when 
the higher number of enterprises registered in Germany is taken into account. 
Recent studies on the determinants influencing the location choice of multinationals show 
that there is a combination of firm-specific, along with environment factors from supply 
and demand, technology, and institutional attributes present in the home and host 
economies (Belberdos et al. 2016, p. Dosso and Vezzani 2015). Supply side factors 
include the type of R&D activities, firm size and corporate performance, location of 
production activities and other specific managerial and organizational practices. For their 
part, the environment factors comprise elements both from the home and host countries, 
such as market size, growth potential and purchasing power, the presence of high quality 
infrastructure and skilled human resources, and agglomeration forces, resulting from 
clusters, scientific parks, or outstanding innovative or creative cities (Dosso and Vezzani 
2015).  
However, can these national and corporate differences also be extended to inventions 
from assignees present in different countries, but operating within the same technology? 
Are these differences also noticeable for the case of the value of their patents? Most 
importantly, could firms, especially SMEs from peripheral areas, find feasible ways to 
reduce these limitations? Our study aims to answer these questions. We particularly study 
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the effect of the number and diversity of assignees on a patent as antecedents that may 
counter the advantages that big and centrally located organizations have, according to 
previous research (Almeida, 1996, Hidalgo et al. 2007, Schiessler 2015). 
In order to study these phenomena in a strictly comparative way, we compared the value 
of patents belonging to assignees across two notably different country sets: patents from 
Germany, representing a central geographic area of R&D, and patents from Spain, 
representing a peripheral country. We based our comparative analysis on three 
dimensions: (1) the same particular technology, namely new manufacturing technologies 
in robotics and automation (2) a common general geographic and institutional 
environment, the European Union, to which the two compared countries belong, and (3) 
the same granting office from a third country, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(henceforth, USPTO).  
Evidence on whether or not large firms benefit more from the patent system is 
contradictory (Holgersson 2013, Jensen and Webster 2006), or varying depending on the 
industry (Doi 1996). Whereas some empirical studies find evidence showing that larger 
firms have more propensity for patenting (Arundel 2001, Iversen 2003, Schiessler 2015), 
other analyses find evidence showing that smaller firms experience higher R&D yields 
(Acs and Audretsch 1990, Bound et al. 1984). It is well known in the literature that 
patenting as a means to protect intellectual property is more accessible to companies 
exceeding a critical size, notably large corporations, in contrast to SMEs, especially with 
respect to resources for monitoring and enforcing their patents (Holgersson 2013, 
Schiessler 2015). Consequently, it is necessary that SMEs find ways to overcome these 
disadvantages. We obtain indications suggesting that a careful selection and partnership 
with research institutes is an option conducive to the production of more valuable patents, 
especially for firms located in peripheral areas for R&D. The implications for managers, 
countries, and institutions are clear, as we state in our concluding remarks.  
We develop our study in this paper as follows. The next section discusses the selected 
field of new manufacturing technologies in robotics and automation with greater 
precision, and explains in greater detail the use of data from granted patents. Next, we 
present our model and pose the hypotheses based on the previous literature and our 
research aims. Following this, we explain the data sets of patents studied and complete 
the logistic regression analysis aimed to test our model, and present our results. We then 
go on to the discussion and conclusions, and the implications for managers and 
institutions. We finish by explaining the limitations of our analysis and the suggestions 
for future areas of improvement. 
 
Literature review on resources and capabilities for R&D in new manufacturing 
technologies 
General-purpose technologies (GPTs) are technologies “characterized by the potential for 
pervasive use in a wide range of sectors and by their technological dynamism” (Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg 1995, p.84). Some previously recognized qualities of these new 
technologies are: (1) their potential for spurring changes to the status quo across 
businesses, sectors or regions (Rotolo, Hicks and Martin 2015), (2) their capital role in 
the history of innovation (Aschhoff et al. 2010), (3) their ability for open innovation 
processes that bring solutions to specific industrial problems (Larsen, et al. 2011), (4) 
their capacity for assuring the future competitiveness and prosperity of states (Sörvik et 
al., 2013), or (5) their capacity for converging “interest between Market requirements and 
Industrial challenges” (Scalia et al. 2017, p.12).  
However, the use of different names in the academic world and policy-making, such as 
Emerging technologies (Rotolo et al. 2015), or Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) 
(Montresor and Quattraro 2017), together with differences in the emphasis put on their 
distinguishing features (Lipsey et al., 2015) have resulted in a certain lack of definition. 
According to the European Commission, KETs are capital to “underpin the shift to a 
greener economy, modernizing Europe’s industrial base, and driving the development of 
entirely new industries.” (European Commission 2014)4. KETs are characterized as 
knowledge intensive technologies, with a high R&D level, reliant on fast innovation 
cycles, and requiring high capital expenditure and highly qualified (i.e. a trained-towards-
research) staff. By nature, KETs are multidisciplinary, cutting across other fields or 
technological solutions, with a tendency to converge and integrate (Van de Velde et al., 
2015). In short, these are technologies allowing a wide variety of applications in the form 
of innovative products or processes. These technologies feed and create value in many 
industrial value chains and sectors in a heterogeneous way, from materials, equipment or 
devices to products and services. Finally, KETs are considered key to the modernization 
of the industrial base and conductors for the creation of new companies.  
The European Commission recognizes a total of six KETs: micro and nanoelectronics, 
nanotechnology, industrial biotechnology, advanced materials, photonics, and advanced 
manufacturing technologies5. Each has its own peculiarities with respect to the distance 
from basic to applied research, its prevalence by regions or countries, or its present 
relevance for economic sectors. Particularly due to its importance in manufacturing 
industries, we selected the KET of advanced manufacturing technologies for our 
empirical analysis. By 2010, the largest EU27 manufacturing subsectors where this KET 
was present were, among others: machinery and equipment manufacturers, food, 
fabricated metal products, motor vehicles, and chemicals (Butter et al. 2014, p.32). 
Precisely, an important share of the industrial activity within these KETs belongs to 
machine-tool and machinery producing companies, which base their commercial activity 
entirely on Business-to-Business marketing and sales. 
In this context, we aim to distinguish value in the production of intellectual property rights 
in this particular KET, stemming from companies’ efforts to team up with other R&D 
partners, and controlling for their size and location. Operationally, we took our indicator 
of value from the number of forward citations of granted patents, a variable frequently 
used as a proxy of their value (Harhoff et al. 1999, 2003, Jaffe and Rassenfosse 2017, 
Petruzzelli et.al.2018).   
 
Hypotheses development 
Size obstacles to R&D and partnership agreements to counter them 
According to the Resource-Based View, firms are “heterogeneous in terms of their 
resources and internal capabilities” (Peteraff 1993, p. 179). Following the same reasoning 
on the one hand, long-lasting and difficult-to-imitate R&D resources and capabilities help 
firms to outperform others in the same industry (Barney 1986, 1991). On the other hand, 
in the face of a particular technological advancement, the forefront scientific nature of 
KETs entails important entry barriers, above all for small and medium-sized (SME) firms, 
and firms with low R&D capabilities. Companies need to have a focused, critical 
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knowledge base and high learning, or absorptive, capabilities within specific fields in 
order to acquire, develop and exploit KET-based advancements successfully (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1989, 1990).  
Zahra and George (2002) recognize absorptive capacity in organizations as a learning 
process consisting of four dimensions: acquisition, assimilation, transformation and 
exploitation. Firms in general must elevate their abilities in all these four dimensions in 
order to achieve innovative solutions (Tsuji et al. 2018). However, these resources and 
capabilities for innovation are not entirely internal to firms but can be attained, at least 
partly, from knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer and Singh 1998) developed through dyads 
or networks of research partners. Secondly, firms do not develop innovative ideas in a 
vacuum, but rather they rely on external sources of information, and combine these with 
their internal sources (Spithoven, Vanharverbeke and Roijakkers 2013). However, 
smaller firms have fewer human resources to screen innovative ideas from the 
environment for valuable information than larger firms (Van de Vrande et al. 2009; 
Dahlander and Gann 2010; Chesbrough 2011). SMEs are usually hindered by “internal 
and external structural impediments”, and lack the critical absorptive capacity “to invest 
in R&D and search for opportunities for partnership” (Wynarczyk, Piperopoulos and 
McAdam 2013, p. 244). Thus, these firms need to team up with other organizations, 
universities and research institutes (von Hippel 1988, Verspagen 2000), in order to 
counter the impediments caused by their small size. The presence of more assignees 
sharing the costs of patent development helps individual firms to overcome these 
obstacles, resulting in higher quality intellectual property, ascertained in the form of 
patents with forward citations. Precisely, SMEs interacting along with other firms, but 
also with governments, semi-public research institutes and universities, gain knowledge 
from the activities of basic and applied research, innovation, invention and diffusion in 
ways that are not ‘linear’ (Kline and Rosenberg 1986).  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned reasons for SMEs to join efforts with R&D partners, 
we must bear in mind the potential problems appearing from the indivisibility, 
inappropriability and uncertainty of resource allocation in the market of intellectual 
property rights (Arrow 1962). Property rights can only provide a partial barrier against 
information spillovers of an innovation, and the mere act of disclosure of the idea through 
a patent is an act of disclosure, and appropriation of knowledge from third parties without 
payment. Also, the potential buyer (or would-be-partner in an R&D work leading to a 
patent) of the innovation will base their decision to buy or participate “on less than 
optimal criteria”. Finally, “it leaves unsolved the problem of the purchaser’s ability to 
judge the value of the information he buys in advance”. In summary, despite the existence 
of intellectual property legal systems, “there is difficulty involved in creating a market 
for information” (p. 616). Therefore, all these difficulties run counter to the decision from 
SMEs to join other parties with the initiative to share innovation benefits and costs.  
By the same token, big firms find incentives to conduct the process towards innovative 
ideas leading to new products “with many projects going on, each small in scale compared 
with the net revenue of the corporation” (Arrow 1962, p.616), and avoid sharing the R&D 
costs especially if there are good prospects for profits. Finally, as a warning to offers to 
enter sharing the benefits and costs of a patent development process, SMEs should 
consider information asymmetries and the risks of the original developer taking an 
opportunistic stance (Akerlof 1970, Pisano 1990) especially when a high risk or cost 
relative to the outcomes is predicted.    
Hence, we pose the following hypotheses:  
H1: The number of assignees in a patent is negatively linked to its value. 
H2: The more diverse the assignees we find in a patent, the less valuable it is. 
Contrary to the arguments leading us to hypothesize against teaming-up with firms, in the 
case of foundations or public entities such as research institutions, the perceived risk of 
opportunism from the idea developers is neutralized by the absence of competition from 
these entities and their non-for-profit focus. Hence: 
H3: Patents which have a research institute among the assignees tend to be more 
valuable. 
Finally, derived from the reflections made on the advantages from company dimension, 
we state: 
H4: Patents from larger assignees tend to be more valuable. 
 
Conditioning effects of the location of R&D activities 
An added difficulty of KETs is that R&D and knowledge transfer based on these 
advancements entail a variable degree of difficulty and uncertainty, depending on the 
country or region where a company performs its R&D activities. The forefront scientific 
nature of KETs supposes potential entry barriers for SMEs and firms with low R&D 
capabilities. Organizations need to have a focused, critical knowledge base and high 
learning capabilities within specific fields (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990) in order to 
acquire, develop and exploit KET-based advancements successfully. Thus, finding 
readily available resources and capabilities in the region or place, or the network of 
relatedness among products in a place (Hidalgo et al. 2007), offering access to some vital 
resources “at arm’s-length” (Dyer & Singh 1998), becomes a significant advantage for 
companies with R&D activity located in these geographically central areas of innovation. 
Hence, our hypothesis is:  
H5: The country of assignee plays a significant role in the value of a patent.  
 
Time effects  
According to Altshuller (2007), technologies tend to evolve in a series of stepwise 
improvements and changes, until becoming mature and then entering obsolescence. 
Technologies that are still in their infancy tend to engender more radical innovations and 
innovative products, whereas those in a mature stage bring a lower number of innovations 
(Scalia et. al. 2017, p. 62). Nevertheless, radicalness of innovations does not necessarily 
equate to innovation value. Innovations that are valuable for firms do not always originate 
from the adoption of nascent technologies. Assuming the contrary is known as recency 
bias, that is, an adverse vision of old knowledge and hence, an undervaluation of potential 
benefits from these mature technologies (Katila, 2002, as cited from Petruzzelli et.al. 
2018). These ideas suggest that the link between time and innovation value is not 
necessarily linear. In fact, there is some consensus on the existence of an inverted 
‘U’shape between maturity and the number of forward citations (Petruzzelli et.al.2018).  
In our model we incorporated two consecutive time periods separately: first, the time 
elapsed from application to grant by the USPTO. Second, the time from the grant date to 
the present time. In the first period, a longer time span may be an indicator of the obstacles 
and difficulties that applicants must overcome in order to receive the patent grant. In other 
words, the time required for approval may be an indicator of poor quality and hence, of 
fewer citations for the patent in the future. Thus, we pose: 
H6.1: Time from file to grant is negatively linked to the value of a patent.  
 
Referring to the second period of time, we must stress that we are not focusing on the 
effect in a medium to long time span, as the KET we studied is, in essence, new. In fact, 
“citations analysis will never be usable for evaluation of current or very recent 
innovations”, because “substantial time is needed after a patent is granted to accumulate 
significant information about its citations” (Hall, et al., 2005, p.31). However, it is clear 
that this is also the case with academic article citations; time always acts in favor of patent 
forward citations, even for nascent or very new technologies. Thus, we pose:   
H6.2: Time from grant date is positively linked to the value of a patent.  
 
Fields of technology  
The number and variety of technology classes in a patent may be a measure of the scope 
or breadth of prior art in a patent (Alcácer and Gittelman 2006). The international patent 
classification (IPC) codes indicate the fields of technology to which the invention of the 
patent under scrutiny pertains (OECD 2009, van Raan 2017). These codes are fixed by 
patent examiners (OECD 2009).  
The number of four digit IPC codes has been taken as a proxy of the patent scope in 
previous research (Lerner 1994, Harhoff et al. 2003). A virtue of patent data for social 
science research lies in the technology-based classification system that allows researchers 
to place patents, inventors and organizations in a technology base, and that is “not derived 
from sales or other economic data that one may be trying to relate to invention” (Jaffe 
and Rassenfosse 2007, p. 1361).  
It is not clear if a more “general” patent will be detrimental or not. Hall et al. (2005) 
suggest that this may be the situation for a specialist firm but not for a conglomerate, due 
to the fact that the former will not be able to appropriate the spillovers to other fields, 
whereas the latter will. In their study on a sample of German patents, Harhoff et al. (2003) 
find no association between the number of 4-digit IPC classifications and the value of 
granted patents. Previous research on patent law shows that the question of patent scope 
becomes critical and difficult for examiners in the case of emergent disciplines that are 
pursued by industries with an incipient product market competition (Merges and Nelson 
1990). Thus, considering the situation of new technologies, such as that represented in 
our study, we infer that the higher the number of classes in a patent, the more problematic 
it will be for patent applicants to convince examiners and obtain grant status. 
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, there is no clear coincidence between the 
approach used to measure patent breadth and the results of this factor in empirical studies. 
However, considering the problematic situations that assignees of a broad patent will face 
both during approval and later, in defending the exclusivity of their claims in cases of 
infringement, we pose the following hypothesis: 
H7: The higher the number of classification codes in a patent, the less valuable it is.  
 
Patent and non-patent citations 
For their part, patent citations primarily serve the legal purpose of indicating which parts 
of the innovation idea described in a patent can be claimed by an applicant, and which 
have previously been claimed in other patents (Verspagen, 2000, Michel and Bettels, 
2001, van Raan 2017). In economic research, patent citations have been repeatedly used 
as indicators of knowledge spillovers (Almeida 1996, Alcácer and Gittelman 2006), value 
of patents (Harhoff et al. 1999, 2003), or firm market value (Griliches 1981, Hall et al. 
2005)6.  
In order to succeed in obtaining a patent grant, the idea presented in the patent application 
must: (a) be novel, (b) have inventive activity, and (c) have industrial applicability. Thus, 
during the application process, this ‘patentability search process’ aims not to miss any 
important technical document (especially including other patents) and looks to make sure 
there are no important limitations in the scope of the claims from the applicants (Michel 
and Bettels, 2001).  
Contrary to non-patent citations (above all in scientific articles), cited patents bear legal 
consequences for the patent applicants, and are of special concern to patent examiners 
(Lerner and Seru 2017, van Raan 2017). Hence, patent citations are not only added by the 
applicants of a patent, but by patent examiners during the revision period. Relevant results 
have been found by differentiating between citations added by applicants and those added 
by examiners. Whereas the former are more focused on detaching their application claims 
from previous patents, the latter tend to be guided by the opposite idea (Cotropia et al. 
2013). It is also worth mentioning that the work performed by examiners adding 
references in an application is far from negligible: references from examiners account for 
6% of the cited non-patent literature and 34% of patents in an application (p.846).  
Maybe the clearest reasoning regarding the effects of the number of citations comes from 
Jaffe and Rassenfosse (2017). Drawing from a previous study led by Trajtenberg et al. 
(1997), these authors explain: “trivial inventions tend to be more extensively rooted on 
previous ideas, whereas more basic inventions are less incremental by nature, and thus 
have fewer identifiable antecedents”. The latter have “less historical background” and 
thus, tend to cite fewer patents (p.1363). Therefore, along these lines, we pose:  
H8.1: The number of scientific articles cited in a patent has a significant negative effect 
on its value.  
H8.2: The number of patents cited in a patent has a significant negative effect on its 
value. 
 
Method and analysis  
General variables and descriptive results 
For the case of the Spanish set, we took the census of granted patents in the US Patent 
and Trademark Office from the KET of Advanced manufacturing technologies, in 
robotics and automation (See Appendix 1). Given the wide variety of technologies 
involved in this KET, for the purposes of our empirical analysis, we concentrated on the 
sub-type of robotics and automation. More specifically, in its identification we used the 
European Commission’s Road Map of cross-cutting KETs (Ro-cKETs), associating one 
or more KETs to a specific International Patent Classification (IPC) string, as described 
by Scalia et al. (2017, p.60 Table 4. See Appendix 1).  
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The population retrieved from USPTO databases was 211 patents containing an assignee 
from Spain. The classification of assignees by country is a variable provided by the 
USPTO records. In the case of the German set, the population at the time of the study 
comprised 11,797 patents for the case of this selected KET. We opted for a systematic 
random sample of 500 patents, respecting the quota proportions from each year of the set. 
No retrieved patent belongs to assignees from both countries at the same time. 
In order to download and complete both sets of patents, we used Loet Leydesdorff’s 
software for patent retrieval and database generation (available from his own homepage 
at www.leydesdroff.net/software). We transformed the original fields present in each 
patent into dichotomous variables, setting the median value of each original variable as 
the class boundary. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive values of the variables used in the 
model. All the variables in this table, except for the assignee’s size in each patent, were 
obtained from the retrieved patents. The largest assignee’s size for each patent is the 
number of employees in the largest organization, and was obtained by using several 
alternative sources. We searched for each assignee’s name in Wikipedia or SABI database 
(from Bureau van Dijk) for the case of the Spanish population of patents. For the case of 
the German sample, we consulted Wikipedia, D&B-Hoovers7, and North Data8. In a 
number of cases, it was necessary to look up the corporate results º on the assignee’s 
webpages. In every case, we looked for the last fiscal year available. Finally, we also 
performed this retrieval of assignees in order to control for those firms or institutions that 
went bankrupt, were absorbed or merged. Only in the case of two patents belonging to 
the same bankrupt and extinguished Spanish firm, were the corresponding patents 
eliminated from the sample. This decision left the number at 209 Spanish patents, 709 in 
total.  
The following table summarizes the main descriptive statistics in both sets: 
Table 1. Main descriptive values of patents 
     
Variable retrieved from patent Value Spain Germany Total 
Number of forward citations [FCitation] Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 0 
 37 
 0.85 
 3.02 
 0 
 0 
 99 
 1.86 
 6.36 
 0 
 0 
 99 
 1.56 
 5.60 
 0 
Number of employees of highest 
assignee [FSize] 
 
 
 
Number of employees per type of 
assignee: 
Firms [AssignCO] 
 
Universities (excluded from model) 
 
Research institutes [AssignRI] 
 
People (excluded from model) 
Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 
 
Mean 
No.elements 
Mean 
No.elements 
Mean 
No.elements 
Mean 
No.elements 
 1 
 274000 
 35066.38 
 69661.46 
 1357 
 
 
 41845.66 
 172 
 2557.56 
 9 
 4914.61 
 28 
 1.67 
 6 
 1 
 642292 
 127766.29 
 166679.38 
 25000 
 
 
 131641.52 
 483 
 13118.60 
 5 
 45478.87 
 16 
 1 
 1 
 1 
642292 
100440.09 
150981.54 
13000 
 
 
108061.54 
655 
6329.36 
14 
19665.25 
44 
1.57 
7 
Number of assignees [Assignees] Min. 
Max. 
 1 
 4 
 1 
 4 
1 
4 
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Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 3.96 
 0.34 
 1 
 3.67 
 0.27 
 1 
1 
0.29 
1.06 
Number of classes from the International 
Patent Classification [IntClass] 
Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 1 
 18 
 3.30 
 2.56 
 3 
 1 
 17 
 3.16 
 2.43 
 2 
 1 
 18 
 3 
 3.22 
 2.48 
Number of cited patents [PatRef] Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 0 
 81 
 13.82 
 11.00 
 11 
 0 
 192 
 14.1 
 13.64 
 12 
 0 
 192 
 14.03 
 12.90 
 12 
Number of cited scientific articles [LitRef] Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 0 
 56 
 2.28 
 5.02 
 1 
 0 
 23 
 1.69 
 2.87 
 1 
 0 
 56 
 1.86 
 3.64 
 1 
Time from application to grant (in years) 
[TimeAppl] 
Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 0.80 
 11.05 
 3.96 
 1.76 
 4.02 
 0.61 
 9.91 
 3.67 
 1.60 
 3.44 
0.61 
11.05 
3.75 
1.65 
3.55 
Time from grant date to present (in 
years) 
[TimeToday] 
Min. 
Max. 
Mean 
Std.Dev. 
Median 
 0.06 
 12.09 
 3.83 
 2.98 
 3.03 
 0.06 
 12.14 
 4.48 
 3.41 
 3.64 
0.06 
12.16 
4.28 
3.30 
3.25 
Population and sample elements:  N 
n (sample)  
 211 
 209 
 11,797 
 500 
 
Note: In brackets, the names of the dummies from each original variable, finally included in the model.  
For the binary logistic regression, the dependent variable considered is the number of 
patent forward citations, dichotomized into zero citations, versus one or more. Two 
reasons explaining this dichotomization are, firstly, the fact that more than 62% of the 
total set of patents have no forward citations, and second, the limited size of the total and 
country sets for the devised model.  
The independent variables are, first, the assignees’ country (Country). For its part, the 
number (Assignees) and types of assignees give way to a collection of variables 
considered in our model. Firstly, a dummy variable (AssignCO) acknowledging that there 
is at least one assignee from the following legal entities: either a public limited company, 
a private-owned company, a limited partnership company or a cooperative. A second 
dummy (AssignRI) considering the cases of patents containing at least one research 
institute among its assignees9. A third dummy produced (VarAssign) from the original 
field of assignees, which is a two-level variable acknowledging the diversity of assignees, 
meaning 1 if there is only one entity or more of a same type, and 2 if it contains at least 
two assignees of different types. The types of assignees considered are: the 
aforementioned different types of firms, research institutes, universities or people. Each 
circumstance is acknowledged with a particular dummy. However, the former two 
categories (i.e. universities and people) were excluded from our study due to the low 
frequencies obtained. 
                                                          
9 The most prominent research institute in Spain is the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
(CSIC). For its part, one of the best-known German research institutes is the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur 
Forderung der Angewandten Forschung E.V. 
The number of categories from the classification of the International Patent Office (WIPO 
2018), also available from USPTO, is represented using a dummy (IntClass), 
distinguishing two types of patents, namely those having up to two 4-digit codes, versus 
those having three or more.  
A variable measuring the time elapsed in years from the application file date to the issue 
(grant) date was converted into a dummy variable (TimeAppl), differentiating patents of 
less than the median time from patents of more than the median time, set at 3.55 years. 
For its part, the second time variable (TimeToday) comprises the time from the issue date 
to the current date (set on May 3, 2018), distinguishing patents in two groups with the 
median equal to 3.25 years as threshold.  
Two variables measure the works cited in each patent. First, the number of scientific 
articles, converted into a dummy (LitRef), with the median set as threshold (1.86 
referenced articles), and second, the dummy transformation (PatRef) from the number of 
cited patents, with its median value (14.03 patents).  
Finally, we consider the size of the biggest assignee within the patent, by number of 
employees (FSize). The criterion for considering the size of the assignee firm or entity 
led us to identify the parent firm or group name in every patent. The reason for this 
decision is backed by prior literature relating size to more capabilities or resources 
dedicated to patent maintenance and vigilance, and exercising more strength and 
experience in case of litigation (Schiessler 2015). 
Results from the binary logistic regressions 
We obtained seven binary logistic regression functions. In general, the variables that are 
common give similar results. Models 1 to 5 are configured to show the marginal effects 
from the different number, variety and type of assignees. Models 6 and 7 study the effects 
of the number of cited articles and cited patents, respectively. Centering on the main 
effects included in all the models, and particularly the country effect, except for Model 3, 
the results show that the assignee’s country is a highly significant factor, in detriment of 
patents belonging to Spanish assignees. Significant coefficients range from -1.282 in 
Model 7 to -2.213 in Model 6, meaning propensities from 72.3% up to 89.16% lower for 
the outcome if belonging to the patents with forward citations, in the case of the Spanish 
set. Thus, Hypothesis H5 stating that the assignees’ country plays a significant role in the 
value of a patent is confirmed, in detriment of the country considered as peripheral in the 
selected KET (Spain in our dataset).  
 
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimated logistic regression coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Country = Spain -1.295**** 
(0.193) 
-1.528**** 
(0.217) 
0.573 
(0.647) 
-1.307**** 
(0.182) 
-2.017**** 
(0.358) 
-2.213**** 
(0.358) 
-1.282**** 
(0.211) 
AssignCO=No. 
Firms 
 -1.254*** 
(0.476) 
     
FSize<13,000 -0.300* 
(0.156) 
-0.362*** 
(0.162) 
-0.369*** 
(0.170) 
-0.564**** 
(0.144) 
-0.522*** 
(0.171) 
-0.561**** 
(0.171) 
-0.285* 
(0.170) 
AssignRI=No 
Res.Institute 
  0.947*** 
(0.478) 
    
VarAssign=Low    1.541* 
(0.824) 
   
Assignees=1     1.391** 
(0.626) 
  
IntClass=Low 0.099 
(0.170) 
0.138 
(0.174) 
0.127 
(0.184) 
0.100 
(0.160) 
0.122 
(0.167) 
0.151 
(0.166) 
0.117 
(0.186) 
TimeAppl=Low 0.199 
(0.151) 
0.206 
(0.157) 
0.215 
(0.165) 
0.183 
(0.143) 
2.333*** 
(0.801) 
0.393*** 
(0.152) 
0.318* 
(0.175) 
TimeToday=Low -2.574**** 
(0.197) 
-2.622**** 
(0.201) 
-2.613**** 
(0.212) 
-2.584**** 
(0.185) 
-2.619**** 
(0.193) 
-2.823**** 
(0.199) 
-2.617**** 
(0.216) 
LitRef=Below      -0.752**** 
(0.158) 
 
PatRef=Below       -0.370** 
(0.175) 
Country = Spain 
& AssignCO=No 
Firms 
 2.338**** 
(0.640) 
     
Country is Spain 
& AssignRI=No 
Res.Institute 
  -2.058*** 
(0.679) 
    
Country=Spain & 
FSize< 13,000 
    1.086** 
(0.425) 
1.282*** 
(0.425) 
 
Cox&Snell’s R2 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
McFadden’s R2 
Obs 
ChiSq  
Degr.Freedom 
-2LL 
0.257 
0.368 
0.248 
709 
210.326 
5 
89.796 
0.265 
0.381 
0.258 
709 
218.734 
7 
107.360 
0.263 
0.377 
0.255 
709 
216.464 
7 
107.845 
0.259 
0.372 
0.251 
709 
212.578 
7 
92.714 
0.265 
0.380 
0.258 
709 
218.483 
8 
100.712 
0.274 
0.393 
0.268 
709 
226.794 
7 
131.383 
0.260 
0.373 
0.252 
709 
213.472 
6 
141.661 
Dependent variable is patent forward citation. Base category is the group of non-cited patents. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ****p<0.001, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
 
With respect to the size of firms, coefficients range from -0.285 (in Model 7) to -0.564 
(Model 4), meaning a 24.8% to 43.1% lower propensity for belonging to the group of 
cited patents, if they are from smaller assignees. Thus, Hypothesis H4, establishing that 
patents from larger assignees tend to be more valuable, is confirmed.  
Thirdly, as expected from the theory, there is a strong and negative marginal effect for 
the newest patents, considering the time elapsed since the issue date (measured with 
variable TimeToday). In particular, coefficients show propensities reduced from 92.4% 
to 94.1% to be among the group of cited patents, in the case of those patents with fewer 
than 3.25 years since the date of grant. These results confirm Hypothesis H6.2, stating 
that the time from grant date is positively linked to the value of a patent. 
With respect to the time from the application file date to the grant date, measured with 
TimeAppl, Models 5, 6 and 7 show that there is a statistically significant positive effect 
if this time is lower than the median (3.55 years). According to these coefficients, patents 
with a shorter time from application to grant have from 1.37 (as in Model 7) to 10.3 times 
higher propensity to belong to the group of cited, or more valuable, patents. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6.1, posing that this time is negatively linked to the value of a patent, is 
partially confirmed. In Models 1 to 4, the obtained regression coefficients are also positive 
for the lower time outcome, but remain non-significant. 
Therefore, considering both time lapses, in all models, regression coefficients of these 
two principal effects show that the shorter the time from application to grant, and the 
longer the time from grant to the present time, the higher the propensity a patent has to 
be among the group of cited patents. 
Finally, the last main effect considered in all the models is the number of classifications 
of the patent. There is no significant evidence of this effect as stated in Hypothesis H7.   
A detailed analysis of models 1 to 5 yields the effects of the types of assignees. In Model 
2 the effect of AssignCO shows that, overall, there is a significantly lower propensity for 
patents not containing a corporate assignee to be among the cited patents. In particular, a 
coefficient of -1.254, meaning a reduction of 71.5% to find a cited patent, if the patent 
has no firm among its assignees. However, here there is an important difference between 
the two countries compared, as shown by the interaction effect between Country=Spain 
and AssignCO=No. Firms. In particular, the coefficient of 2.338 means a positive effect 
of 10.36 times for the Spanish set if the assignees areentities other than firms, that is, 
universities or research institutes. Thus, controlling for the rest of the effects, in the case 
of the Spanish set, not finding any firm among its assignees, increases the odds to have a 
cited patent almost 3 times. 
Model 3 corroborates this last observation as it considers the effect of the presence of a 
research institute among the assignees in a patent. The obtained coefficient of 0.947 
means a general propensity of 2,6 times greater to have a cited patent if from non-research 
institutes. However, this outcome must be corrected with a negative interaction effect of 
-2.058 for the subset of Spanish assignees if there is no research institute among the 
assignees of a patent. The total effect of this variable in the Spanish set equals -1.111, 
meaning that the absence of a research institute among the assignees of a patent reduces 
the possibility of producing a cited patent by 67.1%. Therefore, the results from models 
2 and 3 partially confirm Hypothesis H3 stating that patents which have a research 
institute among their assignees are more valuable. This hypothesis is only confirmed for 
the Spanish case.   
Model 4 considers the effect of the diversity of assignees, as measured by VarAssign. In 
particular, there is a positive coefficient of 1.541 when diversity is low, meaning a 
propensity of 4.67 times to be a cited patent when all the assignees are the same kind or 
if, as is the case of the majority of patents analyzed, there is only one assignee.  
In order to differentiate this coincidence between the state of minimum variety of 
assignees and the number of assignees when there is only one, Model 5 tests the effect of 
the number of assignees (Assignees), in substitution of the variable VarAssign. The 
resulting coefficients show a positive effect when the patent has only one assignee (1.391, 
or about 4 times), compared to patents owned by 2 or more assignees. These coincident 
results from models 4 and 5, give significant evidence backing our hypothesis H1, stating 
that the number of assignees is negatively linked to its value, and H2 posing that the more 
diverse the assignees in a patent, the less valuable it is.  
Models 5 and 6 share an interaction effect between the country and the size of the 
assignee. In both, there is a positive effect for the case of Spanish assignees belonging to 
smaller companies by number of workers. The obtained coefficients are respectively 
equal to 1.086 and 1.282. These results mean that patents from assignees that are Spanish 
and smaller than the median have from 2.96 to 3.60 more possibilities to belong to the 
group of cited patents. Thus, here we find a contradiction to the main effect obtained by 
size, as stated in hypothesis H4. 
Therefore, these results require further analysis. We are also recognizing that the division 
of size using a median of 13,000 employees does not provide a realistic or useful 
interpretation of the size effect on the value of patents for most firms, large or small. The 
Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients between size by number of employees and 
the number of forward citations within each country and the total gives further clearance 
(Table 3): 
 
Table 3. Spearman’s rank order correlations between the size of the biggest assignee and 
the number of forward citations 
 Spain Germany 
 Number of forward citations 
Size of biggest assignee in 
the patent (Employees) 
 
Rho= -0.115* 
(nSp=209) 
Rho= 0.118*** 
(nGe=500) 
Rho=0.126**** 
(n=709) 
Two-tailed tests: ****p<0.001, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
The Spearman’s rank order correlations, linking the size of the biggest assignee with the 
number of forward citations, show opposite results: whereas in the German case, there is 
a positive link between size and number of forward citations, in the Spanish case this 
relation is negative. Therefore, Hypothesis H4 shows significantly contradictory results 
in both sets, being evidenced only in the case of the German set of patents. 
In any case, these results leave room for further conjectures regarding the nature of 
organizations themselves and their partnerships in both sets. The negative correlation for 
the case of Spain is partly explained by the remarkable differences existing in the mean 
values of both analyzed countries and across all the types of assignees defined (Table 1, 
top part). More than 75% of the patents from the Spanish set are placed in the group of 
smaller assignees, having less than 13,000 employees. Secondly, only in the Spanish case 
is the presence of research institutes among the assignees of a patent associated with more 
forward citations, as seen from Model 3. In other words, it is observed in the Spanish set 
that patents have greater possibilities of becoming more valuable if there is a research 
institute among its assignees, or directly if the assignee is a research institute.  
Additionally, there is more insight to be obtained in Model 5, from the positive interaction 
coefficient between assignee size and the country (equaling 1.086 for the case of the 
Spanish and smaller-firm subset), and the positive principal effect when there is only one 
assignee (equal to 1.391). Again, a comparison of the Spearman’s rank order coefficients 
obtained (Table 4) gives different results in each set. 
Table 4. Spearman’s rank order correlations between the number of assignees in a patent 
and the number of forward citations 
 Spain Germany 
 Number of forward citations 
Number of assignees Rho= -0.170** 
(nSp=211) 
Rho= 0.005 
(nGe=500) 
Rho=-0.057 
(n=711) 
Two-tailed tests: ****p<0.001, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
According to this result, in the Spanish case, the more assignees there are in a patent, the 
lower the number of forward citations. Linking these results with the previous review 
from hypothesis H1 to H4, there is some ground to conjecture that when patents are 
predicted to be more valuable, developers tend not to share them with other partners and 
develop them alone. On the contrary, if an idea has poorer prospects for reaching the 
market, then the incentive for opportunism from information asymmetries, that is, a 
potential “lemons” problem (Akerlof 1970, Pisano 1990) will exist, as the developer 
might be prompted to try to license the idea to collaborative partners to share the risks.  
Thus, to summarize this evaluation of the effect of the number of assignees in a patent, 
the results obtained from linking the original variables confirm H1 albeit only for the case 
of the Spanish set. For the case of the German and total sets, no significant correlations 
were obtained .  
Finally, models 6 and 7 consider the effects of scientific articles (LitRef) or the number 
of cited patents (PatRef), respectively. Model 6 shows there is a significant negative 
coefficient (equal to -0.752) for the group of patents containing a number of cited articles 
that is below the median. This effect diminishes the propensity for a patent to be cited by 
up to 52,9%. Thus, Hypothesis H8.1 posing that the number of articles cited has a negative 
effect on the value of the patent is confirmed. Finally, Model 7 shows a significantly 
negative effect resulting from the number of cited patents (-0.370), meaning a reduction 
of 31%. These results confirm Hypothesis H8.2, stating that the number of cited patents 
has a significant negative effect on the patent value.  
 
Conclusions and implications for management and policy-making 
This study confirms that, for various reasons, big firms often use patents to protect 
intellectual property. Firstly, patenting is expensive and even more so when the procedure 
is handled at a foreign patent office. Secondly, patenting involves disclosing sensitive 
information and trusting a legal protection scheme that does not fully or effectively 
guarantee the intellectual property concerned. Thirdly, as a result of these limitations, 
firms usually have other means of safeguarding knowledge, like industrial secrecy 
(Teece, 1986, Mansfield et al. 1981).  
On the other hand, in the case of this KET of advanced manufacturing technologies in 
robotics and automation, we have found that a patent is likely to be more valuable if the 
developer firm is large or belongs to a big group. In the sample analyzed, the value used 
as threshold was 13,000 employees. There is no doubt that this value corresponds to very 
large firms.   
In addition to the size of the assignee, the country of origin was also found to be an 
important factor to predict the value of a patent. Patents prosecuted by Germany assignees 
have a greater likelihood of being more valuable than when the assignee is Spanish, 
regardless of the size of the applicant firm. Therefore, Germany not only has more patents 
than Spain, but we have found that they are also more valuable, in general terms, than 
Spanish patents for the same KET.   
From the business management perspective, smaller firms have to resort to cooperation 
agreements to compensate for their size. However, this arrangement raises serious 
concerns due to the inevitable information asymmetries and the type of knowledge 
involved. These concerns prompt opportunistic behaviour and impose coordination and 
supervision costs. All of the above lead to poorer quality knowledge. At least for Spanish 
firms, which are smaller than German ones (with medians of 1,357 and 25,000 employees 
for this KET respectively), cooperation with technology centers and universities is a good 
option, in line with the argument conjectured in Hypothesis H3.  
Furthermore, it has been proven that the time elapsed between the application and the 
grant date has an important effect on the value of a patent. It has been found that patents 
which took less time to receive approval are the ones that have more forward citations, 
regardless of the assignee's country. It can therefore be stated that it is worth it for firms 
to make efforts to file their patent applications correctly. 
Similarly, we consider that our empirical analysis gives some insight into the study of 
Business-to-Business agreements and their effects on the joint development of intellectual 
property. In agreement with our results, it seems that having plural and diverse partners 
in a patent does not contribute to its value. 
 
Limitations and future lines of research 
In this research, we have taken patents as our element of analysis, controlling for the type 
of assignee, its relationships with other assignees and their size in number of employees. 
However, we have not focused on companies as a unit of analysis. Having focused on the 
company would have deviated us from our objectives. In return, we admit it would have 
allowed us to know firms’ patent portfolios and understand in a more complete way their 
relationships through their portfolios. For example, this could have led us to understand 
better different phenomena such cross licensing or bargaining, among others, how the 
patent portfolio affects the value of a patent or how it affects the relationship between 
innovation and performance (Calantone et al, 2002). 
On the other hand, this research provides some evidence in the sense that the size of the 
company's patent portfolio may be a factor in speeding up approval from the time the 
patent application is filed. However, we have not confirmed this point, and it would be a 
subject for study in the immediate future. The idea underlying this hypothesis is that 
patenting uses large amounts of management resources and is benefited from learning 
economies (Arrow 1962). Thus, it would be logical to think that with a stronger tradition 
in patenting, those firms owning bigger patent portfolios and having patented for longer, 
will tend to have patents of a better quality, as measured by the number of forward 
citations.  
Finally, although we have proved that having plural and diverse partners in a patent does 
not contribute to its value. However, we understand that there are many relations requiring 
confirmation that are beyond the aims set for this study. We particularly refer to horizontal 
agreements between competitors, vertical agreements typical of supply chains or lateral 
agreements with research institutes, universities or foundations. Future studies should 
also focus on in-depth empirical analysis of these types of cooperation in industrial 
relations and B2B in the case of emerging technologies, as well as the reasons for which 
they arise. 
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APPENDIX 1: Relations between KETs and patents IPC 
IPC Code Field of 
Technology  
Description 
B03C Chemical 
Engineering 
MAGNETIC OR ELECTROSTATIC SEPARATION OF 
SOLID MATERIALS FROM SOLID MATERIALS OR 
FLUIDS; SEPARATION BY HIGH-VOLTAGE ELECTRIC 
FIELDS 
B06B Chemical 
Engineering 
GENERATING OR TRANSMITTING MECHANICAL 
VIBRATIONS IN GENERAL 
B06B00016 
B06B000300 
  
B07C Chemical 
Engineering 
POSTAL SORTING; SORTING INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES, 
OR BULK MATERIAL FIT TO BE SORTED PIECE-MEAL, 
e.g. BY PICKING  
B23H Machine 
tools 
WORKING OF METAL BY THE ACTION OF A HIGH 
CONCENTRATION OF ELECTRIC CURRENT ON A 
WORKPIECE USING AN ELECTRODE WHICH TAKES 
THE PLACE OF A TOOL; SUCH WORKING COMBINED 
WITH OTHER FORMS OF WORKING OF METAL 
B23K Machine 
tools 
SOLDERING OR UNSOLDERING; WELDING; 
CLADDING OR PLATING BY SOLDERING OR 
WELDING; CUTTING BY APPLYING HEAT LOCALLY, 
e.g. FLAME CUTTING; WORKING BY LASER BEAM 
B23P Machine 
tools 
OTHER WORKING OF METAL; COMBINED 
OPERATIONS; UNIVERSAL MACHINE TOOLS  
B23Q Machine 
tools 
DETAILS, COMPONENTS, OR ACCESSORIES FOR 
MACHINE TOOLS, e.g. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COPYING 
OR CONTROLLING (tools of the kind used in lathes or boring 
machines B23B 27/00); MACHINE TOOLS IN GENERAL, 
CHARACTERISED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
PARTICULAR DETAILS OR COMPONENTS; 
COMBINATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS OF METAL-
WORKING MACHINES, NOT DIRECTED TO A 
PARTICULAR RESULT 
B25J Handling MANIPULATORS; CHAMBERS PROVIDED WITH 
MANIPULATION DEVICES 
G01D Measureme
nt 
MEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A 
SPECIFIC VARIABLE; ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT 
COVERED BY A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF 
METERING APPARATUS; TRANSFERRING OR 
TRANSDUCING ARRANGEMENTS NOT SPECIALLY 
ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; MEASURING 
OR TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
G01F Measureme
nt 
MEASURING VOLUME, VOLUME FLOW, MASS FLOW, 
OR LIQUID LEVEL; METERING BY VOLUME [ 
G01H Measureme
nt 
MEASUREMENT OF MECHANICAL VIBRATIONS OR 
ULTRASONIC, SONIC OR INFRASONIC WAVES  
G01L Measureme
nt 
MEASURING FORCE, STRESS, TORQUE, WORK, 
MECHANICAL POWER, MECHANICAL EFFICIENCY, OR 
FLUID PRESSURE  
G01M Measureme
nt 
TESTING STATIC OR DYNAMIC BALANCE OF 
MACHINES OR STRUCTURES; TESTING OF 
STRUCTURES OR APPARATUS, NOT OTHERWISE 
PROVIDED FOR 
G01P Measureme
nt 
MEASURING LINEAR OR ANGULAR SPEED, 
ACCELERATION, DECELERATION OR SHOCK; 
INDICATING PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT; 
INDICATING DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT  
G01Q Measureme
nt 
SCANNING-PROBE TECHNIQUES OR APPARATUS; 
APPLICATIONS OF SCANNING-PROBE TECHNIQUES, 
e.g. SCANNING-PROBE MICROSCOPY [SPM] [2010.01] 
G05B Control CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; 
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; 
MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS 
G05D Control SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-
ELECTRIC VARIABLES 
G05F Control SYSTEMS FOR REGULATING ELECTRIC OR MAGNETIC 
VARIABLES  
G05G Mechanical 
elements 
CONTROL DEVICES OR SYSTEMS INSOFAR AS 
CHARACTERISED BY 
MECHANICAL FEATURES ONLY  
G06M Computer 
technology 
COUNTING MECHANISMS; COUNTING OF OBJECTS 
NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
G07C Control TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR 
INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; 
GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR 
LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS 
OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR 
ELSEWHERE  
G08C Telecommu
nications 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR MEASURED VALUES, 
CONTROL OR SIMILAR SIGNALS 
 
